You’re doing a bunch of things at this very moment. You’re reading this research statement. You’re maintaining your balance. And you’re exerting a certain number of newtons of force on the surface supporting your weight. Exerting a certain number of newtons of force is something that any other massive object can do: it is not an exercise of agency. Maintaining your balance is something that many other animals can do: it is an exercise of animal agency. But reading this research statement is distinctive. You can read this research statement only because you, unlike rocks and (presumably) rhinos, can engage in better or worse reasoning: your reading the statement is an exercise of rational agency. You could have a better or worse reason for reading this statement. Perhaps you’re curious about my research; or perhaps you’re putting off reading the paper your past self generously, but foolhardily, agreed to referee. Because you can have a better or worse reason for doing it, your reading this statement might be a more or less rational action.
What distinguishes your reading this statement from your maintaining your balance, or from a rhino’s scratching its hide against a tree? What distinguishes your giving yourself a chocolate at the end of a long day because you darn well earned it from your exerting a downward force? My research aims to answer these questions. In so doing, I shed light on the role that logic and reasoning play in exercises of rational agency, and on how rational agency can in turn inform our thinking about logic.
At the moment, my main research project is on the basing relation, which is crucial to many exercises of rational agency. The basing relation obtains between an action and reason for which it is done. In my dissertation, I developed the Hereby-Commit Framework for understanding the basing relation. The core claim is that something done on the basis of a reason—whether drawing a conclusion from premises, or reading a research statement to avoid doing other work—plays a distinctive functional role. When one does something on the basis of a reason, one—in the very doing—thereby commits to that reason favoring that doing. The Hereby-Commit Framework offers a unified picture of the relation at the heart of both epistemic and practical rationality. Furthermore, the framework dissolves problems that have long-hindered philosophical progress, including Lewis Carroll’s regress and the problem of deviant causal chains.
I’m currently pursuing three lines of inquiry related to the Hereby-Commit Framework. First, what is the nature of commitment and what precise role do commitments play in exercises of rational agency? Second, how unified are different exercises of rational agency, such as believing on the basis of a reason and acting on the basis of a reason? Third, are there distinctive norms that govern how an agent’s attitudes are based on one another? If so, how do they interact with other rational norms?
2022. “Acting and Believing on the Basis of Reasons”. Philosophy Compass. (Show/hide abstract)
This paper provides an opinionated guide to discussions of acting and believing on the basis of reasons. I aim to bring closer together largely separate literatures in practical rea- son and in epistemology. I focus on three questions. First, is basing causing? Causal theories of basing remain popular despite the notorious Problem of Deviant Causal Chains. Causal theorists in both the epistemic and practical domains have begun to appeal to dispositions to try and solve the problem. Second, how unified are acting and believing on the basis of reasons? I consider an important challenge to their unity due to Setiya. I sketch a response, which posits unity of causal structure across acting and believing on the basis of reasons. Third, how does acting or believing on the basis of a good reason relate to acting or believing on the basis of a reason simpliciter? I generalize a recent argument of Lord and Sylvan’s to include acting as well as believing. The conclusion is that, for both believing and acting, φing on the basis of a good reason does not amount to φing on the basis of a reason that just so happens to be good.
2021. “Reasons, Basing, and the Normative Collapse of Logical Pluralism“. Philosophical Studies. (Show/hide abstract)
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. A key objection to logical pluralism is that it collapses into monism. The core of the Collapse Objection is that only the pluralist’s strongest logic does any genuine normative work; since a logic must do genuine normative work, this means that the pluralist is really a monist, who is committed to her strongest logic being the one true logic. This paper considers a neglected question in the collapse debate: what is it for a logic to do genuine normative work? As well as having wider upshot for the connection between logic and normativity, grappling with this question provides a new response to the Collapse Objection on behalf of the pluralist. I suggest that we should allow logics to generate pro tanto reasons in a way that bears not just on combinations of attitudes but on how an agent’s attitudes are based on one another. This motivates adopting normative principles that allow the pluralist’s weaker logics to earn their normative keep. Rather than being ad hoc, these principles capture a sense in which good reasoning goes beyond the consistency of an agent’s attitudes. Good reasoning is also concerned with how an agent’s attitudes are based on one another.
2020. “The Hereby-Commit Account of Inference”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (Show/hide abstract)
An influential way of distinguishing inferential from non-inferential processes appeals to representational states: an agent infers a conclusion from some premises only if she represents those premises as supporting that conclusion. By contrast, when some premises merely cause an agent to believe the conclusion, there is no relevant representational state. While promising, the appeal to representational states invites a regress problem, first famously articulated by Lewis Carroll. This paper develops a novel account of inference that invokes representational states without succumbing to regress. The key move is to reject the tempting idea that the relevant representational states are causally prior to inferences. I argue instead that an inference constitutes the relevant representational state. To infer is thus—in the very drawing of the conclusion—to represent the premises as supporting the conclusion, and to thereby commit to that support relation.
2020. “Fake News, Relevant Alternatives, and the Degradation of Our Epistemic Environment”. Inquiry. (Show/hide abstract)
This paper contributes to the growing literature in social epistemology of diagnosing the epistemically problematic features of fake news. I identify two novel problems: the problem of relevant alternatives; and the problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment. The former arises among individual epistemic transactions. By making salient, and thereby relevant, alternatives to knowledge claims, fake news stories threaten knowledge. The problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment arises at the level of entire epistemic communities. I introduce the notion of an epistemic environment, roughly the totality of resources and circumstances relevant to assessing epistemically interesting statuses, such as knowledge. Fake news degrades our epistemic environment by undermining confidence in epistemic institutions and altering epistemic habits, thereby making the environment less conducive to achieving positive epistemic statuses. This is problematic even if the decrease in confidence and the altering of habits are rational. I end by considering solutions to these problems, stressing the importance of reproaching each other for proliferating fake news. I argue that we should reproach even faultless purveyors of fake news. This is because fake news typically arises in abnormal epistemic contexts, where there is widespread ignorance of, and noncompliance with, correct epistemic norms.
2020. “Deflationism about Logic”. Journal of Philosophical Logic. (Show/hide abstract)
Logical consequence is typically construed as a metalinguistic relation between (sets of) sentences. Deflationism is an account of logic that challenges this orthodoxy. In Williamson’s recent presentation of deflationism, logic’s primary concern is with universal generalizations over absolutely everything. As well as an interesting account of logic in its own right, deflationism has also been recruited to decide between competing logics in resolving semantic paradoxes. This paper defends deflationism from its most important challenge to date, due to Ole Hjortland. It then presents two new problems for the view. Hjortland’s objection is that deflationism cannot discriminate between distinct logics. I show that his example of classical logic and supervaluationism depends on equivocating about whether the language includes a “definitely” operator. Moreover, I prove a result that blocks this line of objection no matter the choice of logics. I end by criticizing deflationism on two fronts. First, it cannot do the work it has been recruited to perform. That is, it cannot help adjudicate between competing logics. This is because a theory of logic cannot be as easily separated from a theory of truth as its proponents claim. Second, deflationism currently has no adequate answer to the following challenge: what does a sentence’s universal generalization have to do with its logical truth? I argue that the most promising, stipulative response on behalf of the deflationist amounts to an unwarranted change of subject.
2018. “Logical Pluralism without the Normativity”. Synthese. Coauthored with Gillian Russell. (Show/hide abstract)
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promising of which depends not on logic’s normativity but on epistemic goals.
Papers Under Review (Titles Changed to Facilitate Anonymous Review)
“A Paper on Basing”. (Show/hide description)
Uses the Hereby-Commit Framework to give an account of acting on the basis of a reason. In so doing, solves the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains, and the Problem of Rational Evaluability.
Papers In Preparation (Available on Request)
“Against the Constitutivist Construal of Inference”. (Show/hide description)
Some theorists have recently construed inference as a constitutive rather than a causal relation. Roughly, the Constitutivist Construal holds that four things constitute drawing the conclusion that q
and from if p then q
: (i) believing that p
; (ii) believing that if p then q
, representing p
and if p then q
as conclusively supporting q
; (iv) not being irrational. The view is promising but ultimately unsuccessful. First, it struggles to generalize beyond deductive inference. Second, clause (iv) cannot be spelled out without circularity.
“Rationality and the First Person”. (Show/hide description)
Raises a puzzle (distinct from Kolodny’s well known one) about how structural rationality can be normative from the first-personal perspective. Suggests that the most promising current approaches to structural rationality fail to solve the puzzle. Sketches a vindicatory genealogy (à la Edward Craig and Bernard Williams) of structural rationality that aims to shed light on the puzzle.